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1 SCOPE: CLASSIFYING RESILIENCE FOR THE CLOUD
Resilience, in the context of computer systems and networks, is defined in many ways. Some consider it synonymous
with fault-tolerance [84]. Laprie provides two descriptions: "the persistence of dependability when facing changes" and
"the persistence of service delivery that can justifiably be trusted, when facing changes" [62]. Sterbenz et. al. provides
a similar definition: "the ability of the network to provide and maintain an acceptable level of service in the face of
various faults and challenges to normal operation" [112]. Queiroz et. al. suggests: "Resilience is the capacity of critical
services to adapt in order to provide their functionalities in cases of undesired events compromising parts of the system."
[95].Abdullah et. al. [1] considers a business/organisation perspective : "Resilience refers to the capacity of human
beings/system/organization to survive and thrive in the face of adversity...it is a property that is closely associated with
the capacity to avoid, contain and mitigate accidents". Or simply, : "the percentage of lost traffic upon failures" [67].These
few definitions indicate the numerous factors which can be considered during the development and deployment of a
resilient system. This variety is related to the variety of fields in which resilience is applied. As each will have different
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characteristics, numerous measurement methodologies will appear. Additionally, specific use-cases may omit certain
characteristics due to their lesser relevance.
In this survey, we adhere to the comprehensive definitions of the Resilinets model by Sterbenz et al. They cover a
variety of measurable or desirable characteristics of resilience, grouped into trustworthiness and challenge tolerance,
viewed as internal and external factors respectively. These may be adapted as appropriate in order to take into account
novel features of the cloud. We direct the reader to the resilience discipline definitions categorised within [112].
1.1 Defining the Cloud
Cloud computing is a service-driven computing model whereby an end-user will provision and use computing resources
from a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) in line with an agreed upon Service Level Agreement (SLA). The service hosted
by the CSP could take many forms. Consisting of networking, storage or computational components [76]. Similar to
traditional computing environments, cloud environments are multi-layered. The composition differs depending upon
the CSP infrastructure, the application’s use-case or the particular model used for analysis.
A typical cloud datacentre would consist of the underlying physical infrastructure: servers, storage arrays and
networking hardware. Virtualised Infrastructure (VI), a pool of resources: virtual machines (VMs) and/or containers
running atop of virtual machine monitors (VMM)s with Virtual Storage (VS) devices and Virtual Networks (VNs).
These resources are situated upon the Physical Infrastructure (PI) hardware, connected by Physical Networking (PN). A
management layer coordinates physical Resource Management (RM) and the service life cycle. Performance is managed
through distributing services using Load Balancing (LB). Services are created and managed using Service Orchestration
(SO) and executed using Service Scheduling (SCH). Further service-oriented capabilities such as security are also
provided.
The datacentre (DC) architecture is relevant when examining resilience within cloud infrastructure as it is the
foundations upon which the cloud service will sit. However the resilience of the DC is not always relevant to the
resilience of a service being hosted. For example a cloud service may straddle multiple forms of infrastructure and
secondly the user/CSP may have no ability to affect the resilience at this layer, dependent upon the cloud service
delivery model employed.
In the NIST definition for cloud computing [76] the prominent service delivery models are defined as a layered archi-
tecture: Software-as-a-Servce (SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service(PaaS) and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). Responsibilities
(for the management / configuration / security etc.) of the service being delivered vary between CSP and the user. This
division of responsibility is an important concept within the context of resilience, as the level of control given may
determine the user’s abilities to affect its resilience. NIST defines a further 3 actors: auditor, broker and carrier.
Due to emerging disciplines and delivery models, matters are complicated further. In addition to those layers discussed
above there are layers within the decentralised cloud. Once considered to be an emerging discipline, Cloud computing
is now arguably emerged, although is constantly evolving. In tandem with new technologies and use-cases, new forms
of cloud computing are developed to accommodate emerging disciplines such as the internet of things (IoT) and big
data. These involve distributing the cloud services across devices or network architectures dissimilar to the typical DC
only model.
Bilal et. al. explains: "different emerging technologies situated at the edge of the network to provide computational
and storage resources to deliver real-time communication with minimum latency" [20]. While Baktir et. al. explain
that despite differences, these disciplines all largely attempt to accomplish the same goal and are variations of edge
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disciplines. What varies is their use-case, and presumably the underlying technologies in which the new processing
occurs [11] .
A summary of these emerging disciplines are below:
• Fog Computing - seen first as an extension to the cloud but now as complimentary or independent from it. It
involves a hierarchy of services where some processing/storage is executed closer to the edge of the network
whilst analytics can occur in the cloud. This can occur in small-scale clouds but also on a variety of different
hardware such as base stations, routing hardware, etc. [98] [82] [20] [90]
• Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) - the concept of resource augmentation from a mobile to a remote device in
order to maximise resource efficiency and power consumption. Originally intended for centralised cloud DCs,
the potential for processing at the edge is now seeing interest [124] [20] [98].
• Cloudlets - involve the deployment of small clouds, used to reduce short falls in mobile cloud computing [20]
[2] .
• Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) - provides cloud services at the edge of cellular networks such as 5G nodes, this
increases performance through latency reduction, traffic optimisation and enhanced services e.g. location-driven
[98] [72] [73]. [90] [20] [124] .
• Mist Computing - pushes data processing services as far as possible to the sensor and actuator devices [93]
[119]
These definitions illustrate that decentralised disciplines involve distributing cloud services closer to the edge of the
network, where the end-user device, sensor or actuator will be. Within the context of this work, in order to manage the
complexity associated with non-standardised and evolving definitions, these cloud disciplines are grouped into 3 layers.
This creates a new hierarchy of centralised and decentralised cloud architectures, where services may be positioned in
one or more layers. The topmost layer is the centralised cloud infrastructure within a data centre. The middle layer is
the fog, where cloud services and data processing can occur during transit to the cloud or in a constrained manner
upon devices closer to the application edge. The final layer, mist, is where the sensors, actuators and user devices sit
and where minimal processing may occur. This model represents the hierarchical layered cloud family of disciplines,
components of these disciplines (i.e. the physical devices, protocols and actors) sit within these layers.
The following points are made considering resilience in emerging cloud disciplines:
• The cloud infrastructure’s distinct architecture is relevant to understanding it’s own resilience but not always
responsible for guaranteeing service resilience. Therefore the relationship between resilience techniques operating
in lower-levels and a service on a higher-level should be established.
• Emerging disciplines cause services to be delivered on decentralised cloud infrastructure far away from the DC,
sometimes independently from it.
• The chosen service delivery model will affect the ability of the user or CSP to adjust the resilience of the service.
Therefore this is a key factor in resilience technique selection. All delivery models can be employed upon all
architectures although with greater constraints closer to the edge.
We illustrate in figure 1 the relationship between the centralised and decentralised cloud disciplines and their
underlying architectural constituents. The diagram shows that cloud disciplines (coloured) may span one or more
architectural layers, potentially encompassing a variety of different hardware configurations in addition to physical and
logical architectures.
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Fig. 1. Decentralised cloud computingmodel. Illustrating the relationship and overlap between different cloudmodels and architectural
components. MEC=Mobile Edge Computing, MCC=Mobile Cloud Computing
1.2 Related Work in Cloud Resilience
Due to the novelty of this area, surveys in resilience are limited, this work extends our previous survey in [125], which
lacks the detailed analysis according to techniques and disciplines presented here, in addition to the further analysis of
the decentralised cloud. Moreover, this work compliments our previous survey on intrusion detection for resilient IoT
[17], which is out of the scope of this paper.
A few surveys encompass some aspects of this work. Cheraghlou et. al. provides a survey of fault tolerant specific
architectures in the cloud [29], Milani et. al. presents a survey of data replication techniques in the cloud [78] and
Mistrik et. al. discusses fault tolerant workflow management techniques [91]. Colman-Meixner et.al present the only
survey on resilience techniques in cloud computing infrastructure [30]. Employing a layered model, they provide an
in depth study involving classification of resilience approaches used. Their primary findings highlight that for cloud
systems, replication and checkpointing are the most common techniques for storage, virtualisation and migration
from the storage side and multi-layer protection for networking. However, a considerable number of techniques they
evaluated are based on non-cloud environments which may be applicable to the cloud. That approach is avoided in
this work due to its open-ended nature. Additionally their model fails to account for emerging/decentralised cloud
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disciplines. Without this consideration it becomes difficult to understand how integration and interoperability between
emerging disciplines will affect the resilience at different layers. In contrast, this review will focus upon resilience
techniques which enable a given CSP to deliver services resiliently upon their platform using any delivery model.
As a contribution to knowledge, we propose a model which encompasses the decentralised cloud and its relationship
with the centralised cloud. We review only cloud-centric techniques. Definitions from the Resilinets model [112] are
then applied to provide a rigid classification of techniques employed throughout literature. Combining these two models,
each work can now be classified appropriately in terms of cloud layer, cloud components used and resilience disciplines
enabled. This is important to manage the scope and complexity of the survey. This survey classifies work in cloud
service resilience according to a number of factors:
• Where in the hierarchy of centralised/decentralised cloud disciplines the work is situated.
• The architectural components according to the model in figure 1 the work applies to.
• The cloud delivery model that the work applies to.
• The resilience disciplines that apply to the work, according to the resilinets model [112]
• The techniques used to accomplish the resilience.
Theworkwill therefore be consideredwithin the following categorieswhich are representative of the centralised/decentralised
cloud environment.
(1) Physical and data-centre resilience - techniques used to enhance the resilience of the datacentre. Placed here
for completeness and to illustrate the underlying resilience
(2) Virtual Resource Abstraction - the resilience of virtualised/abstracted resources such as VS, VI, VMMs etc
(3) CloudManagement - techniques associated with cloud middleware / management e.g. orchestration of services
(4) Decentralised Cloud - resilience techniques for cloud environments which are closer to the network edge.
(5) Alternative Architectures - methods using unconventional architectures.
1.3 Paper selection criteria
Papers were selected for inclusion after searching popular databases, namely ACM Library, IEEE Explore, Science Direct
and Google scholar. A number of keyword permutations were used which involved "resilience" combined with different
cloud computing models and architectures e.g. "resilient PaaS", "Cloud resilience" etc. During this search it quickly
transpired that resilience definitions vary considerably from author to author. This is the motivation for leveraging
the resilinets model [112] as it provided a consistent definition and classification of these disciplines. This model is
also frequently found referenced in other works and therefore provided support to its accuracy. These disciplines then
replaced the resilience keyword with variations of cloud computing to procure more works for evaluation.
Scope management is an important issue due to the range of disciplines involved and the complex nature of the
cloud. Firstly, papers were omitted which did not focus solely upon cloud environments. While intuitive, the authors in
[30] include a number of non-cloud works which could still be applicable. Although relevant to resilience in general
it was decided this these papers could skew our analysis and could cause the review to be open ended. The one
exception is works which focus upon data-centre resilience where deemed relevant. In a similar manner a number of
security-oriented papers were excluded as techniques for firewalls, intrusion detection systems, etc. can largely be
applied anywhere but the authors’ did not have a cloud resilience specific goal. Finally, works older than 10 years at the
time of first selection were omitted. Overall, these works were selected to answer the following: What was the current
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state of the art in cloud computing resilience, including what techniques were used, how effective are they and what are
their limitations? It was also conducted in order to identify any further gaps in the field to provide situation of the work.
2 STATE-OF-THE-ART IN CLOUD RESILIENCE
This section surveys literature according to the layers defined previously. Each work is analysed according to the
techniques used and cloud components applied. A summary table is given for each section.
2.1 Physical and data-centre resilience
DCs are used as a strong argument that the security and resilience of cloud computing is greater than that of traditional
paradigms. Largely because cloud infrastructures are typically hosted in DCs with greater facilities than those possible
to finance or manage by a single organisation. Highly redundant resources, excellent power resilience, excellent physical
security and strong network links to the internet backbone. Therefore these underlying characteristics ensures these
environments are resilient by nature. This section discusses a number of works in this layer which attempt to improve
this further. Table 1 summarises this literature.
Mohamed discusses the area comprehensively, without the cloud context. He reiterates the inherent resilience of
data centres and evaluates routing protocols, load balancing and graph analysis techniques to providing enhanced
resilience [81].
Lou et. al. consider Cloud network survivability and sustainability within the context of energy aware solutions:
Energy aware Backup Protection (EABP) [71]. They argue that as the requirement for energy efficient services increases,
survivability and resilience should not be ignored. They present a new model which allows multiple links to share
one backup, drastically reducing capacity requirements with only a small increase in energy consumption. It is not
certain whether the system will maintain resilience in the case that the number of links failed exceeds the capacity
of the backup. Goścień and Walkowiak also consider survivability [44]. They undertake a study to investigate the
physical placement of DCs along optical fibre links from a topology and demographic-economical perspective. They
illustrate that placement policies have a strong impact upon survivability. Applying a monte-carlo tree search for
resource allocation has been shown to optimise this process [3].
Conversely, Couto et. al. illustrate that survivability techniques including placement and redundancy can have grave
negative effects upon the latency of applications in highly survivable situations (up to 80% degradation) [33]. Which is
intuitive yet relevant. They also discuss the design for clouds which must be resilient in the face of disasters [110], in
contrast to many surveyed works. Their motivation is that most SLAs do not cover disaster resilience, (e.g. hurricanes).
A key component for their resiliency is geographical distribution and fail-over systems for activation during the event
of a failure. They present a methodology for developing disaster resilient networks and also a VM placement algorithm
[32].
Zhang et. al. propose resource orchestration as a technique to enable survivability in optical networks through
minimising datacentre provisioning [130]. Additionally they aggregate backup "k-node" links for multiple users to
improve surivivability in a resource optimal manner upon disaster [64].
Chandna et. al. present a survivability solution in optical DC networks using Software Defined Networking (SDN)
[27]. They illustrate the strength of these techniques and highlight that most future methods are likely to employ SDN.
However whilst geo-distribution improves resiliency it does not guarantee it. They highlight the necessity for VM
placement algorithms as a high priority for guaranteeing resilience for cloud SLAs. This work highlights the need to
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understand the differing network layers when considering resilience in the cloud. Therefore an important question is:
how effectively can resilient virtual networks be designed without information about its lower layers?
Table 1. Data and Physical Layer Resilience
Method Model Components Disciplines Limitations
Back-up links [71] Phy PI SRV High Cost
Optimal geo-distribution of datacentres
[110]
Phy DC’s DT High cost
Server placement for VM backups [32] IaaS PI; DC DT Physical layer only
Optimal routing using load balancing
and graph analysis [81]
Phy PI; DC; R,FT Non-cloud
Topology and demographic/economic
focused dc placement [44]
Phy PI; DC; SRV Only available to some CSP
Monte-carlo tree search for resource
provisioning [3]
Phy PI; DC; RM SRV Only available to some CSP
Datacentre provision for resource opti-
misation [130]
Phy PI; DC; RM SRV High Cost and complexity
User aggregated link sharing [64] Phy, PI; DC; RM SRV Limited compartmentalisation
Simulating survivability scenarios [33] Phy PI; DC SRV Simulation only
Leverage SDN for survivability [27] Phy PI; DC; VN; RM SRV Centralised management
PI=Physical Infrastructure, DC=Data Centres, RM=Resource Management, VN=Virtual Networking, SRV=Survivability,
FT=Fault Tolerance, R=Resilience, DT=Disruption Tolerance
2.2 Virtual Resource Abstraction
The works reviewed in the following sub-sections describe techniques which are used to provide resilience to a particular
VR such as VS, instances, VNs or the VMMs such as hypervisors.
2.2.1 Storage. The most simplistic method of ensuring resiliency of data is replication. When a failure happens, copies
are accessed or migrated. This principle is the basis of many storage resiliency techniques such as the commonly
deployed Redundant Array Inexpensive Disks (RAID). Storage, however, is expensive so techniques to reduce the cost
of redundancy are sought after. This is not just the cost of the hardware but also methods ensuring consistency. There is
a current drive to move the majority of an organisation’s storage to cloud infrastructures, due to their inherent storage
resilience upon mass redundancy of resources and global remote access. Therefore as the standard cloud could be
considered a resilient storage mechanism, the techniques discussed will focus on more extreme scenarios or optimisation
techniques. Table 2 summarises this literature.
Jaiswal et. al. present Resilient Storage Cloud Map (RSCMap) [53]. It’s goal is optimising the design of resilient
cloud storage via disaster recovery planning. It permits an appropriate replication function to be selected according to
the data type, needs and cost available. This is applicable to a variety of use-cases. The efficacy of relying on disaster
recovery for resilience is questionable due to the number of situations (e.g. data leakage, safety-critical systems) where
resilience is required prior to a system fault.
Westmark provides another technique focusing upon resilience to disasters (disruption tolerance) [126]. They propose
Rapid Data Evacuation (RDE) in which a-priori knowledge of an imminent disaster permits a heuristic to determine the
external network links with the least delay. This enables safe and quick data migration from the cloud. Similarly, Yao et.
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al. determine the shortest window necessary for backups in order to optimise the cost of replication in case of a disaster
scenario [129].
An alternative to needing to evacuate data is to ensure it is replicated across diverse locations in the first instance.
Gonzalez et. al. present a network overlay to optimise data management across multiple data-centre sites [43]. Bessani
et. al. develop a software library called DEPSKY which utilises consumer cloud storage solutions from multiple providers
to provide diverse replication for object storage [19]. Whereas Matos et. al. give a different perspective providing the
resilience from the client through enhancing the security of the client machine [75].
Methods of optimising the replication, typically for cost reasons can be frequently found. Calis and Koyluoglu
focus upon mitigating blocks (groups of storage nodes) which fail simultaneously [24]. Using Block Failure Resilient
codewords, which facilitate the recovery of a block from neighbour blocks utilising load balancing. Nachiappan et. al.
conducts a survey on both coding and replication techniques [83]. They suggest that a hybrid method of both is the
only cost effective way of guaranteeing storage resilience in the cloud.
Liu and Shen argue that the majority of resilient storage techniques in the cloud are effective at either correlated or
non-correlated failures [68]. They propose a multiple failure resilient replication scheme (MRR) accommodating both
forms. They use a nonlinear integer programming approach to accommodate multiple objectives. Which are a reduction
in network latency to optimise consistency and the optimal number of replications and storage upon inexpensive media.
Whilst still maintaining high-availability.
Qu and Xiong attempt to optimise the quantity of needed replications for a specific use-case which is unknown
quantity of web requests [94]. Their method of replication across all nodes is in contrast to the typical micro-services
architecture and raises questions of scalability and compartmentalisation. Wang et. al. focuses simply on ensuring
the integrity of data in cloud infrastructures [123]. Their technique is unconcerned with whether the data is altered
maliciously or through hardware fault. A block-based storage mechanism enables the location of data corruption to be
identified to permit fast recovery. Finally, Yanez-Sierra take a holistic approach by attempting to provide resilience
through modelling the entire data workflow, from client to cloud [128]. Their component-based approach allows
modularity and features to be applied and examined at each stage.
2.2.2 Instance and VMM Techniques. Within this section, application layer resilience is referred to as examining an
individual instance such as a VM or container and not considering the platform of multiple applications. Table 3 provides
a summary.
Nguyen et. al. argue that network and system fault-tolerance is well covered by conventional architectures and
therefore they focus upon application resilience [85]. They propose a test bed facilitating error detection and recovery
of cloud applications. They explain that errors may be detected long after their cause was executed and that tracing the
exact cause can be difficult due to multiple software layers and component dependencies. They cite the complexity
of scalable software as a cause of these issues. In order to accommodate management of errors appropriately, they
deploy an error ranking system according to severity. This enables selection of an appropriate action such as to ignore,
restart or revert. The software takes advantage of virtualisation within cloud environments to accomplish this. The
implementation details are scarce but it is important to note that this method does take into account generalised
application faults so would detect malicious and non-malicious faults although it is not explicitly stated as a goal of the
software.
VI is a common solution to issues such as intrusion due to the ability to revert the system in question to a clean
state and migrate them to other nodes. Lombardi et. al. present a system for enhanced resilience of Windows VMs,
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Table 2. Storage Resilience Techniques
Method Model Components Disciplines
Cost-based disaster recovery planning,
replication [53]
IaaS VS A, DT Disaster-recovery not always
beneficial to service delivery
Code-based recovery [24] IaaS VS A, FT Cost resulting from groups of
nodes
Rapid data evacuation (RDE) prior to
disaster event using a heuristic to select
least delay paths [126]
IaaS/ VS DT A-pirori disaster knowledge,
bandwidth requirements
Network overlay on diverse storage
across multi DCs [43]
PaaS VS, VN, RM, SO FT High replication cost
Replication covering correlated and
non-correlated failures [68]
IaaS VS FT High replication cost
Storage across diverse cloud-of- clouds
[19]
IaaS VS, RM FT, SEC High replication cost
Provide security to the client side of
cloud storage services [75]
Client CD SEC Client side only
A survey and hybrid technique between
erasure coding and replication [83]
IaaS VS, RM FT High replication cost
Efficient replication for unknown query
rate [94]
IaaS VS, RM FT High replication cost
Homomorphic token and erasure data
[123]
IaaS VS FT, I Data loss with loss of key
Component based workflow RM from
client to cloud [128]
PaaS VS, RM FT, SEC Complex modelling process
Multi-dc backup disaster routing, short-
est window for disaster RB [129]
IaaS DC; VS, RM DT A-priori disaster knowledge,
High replication cost
VS=Virtual Storage, VN=Virtual Networking, RM=Resource Management, SO=Service Orchestration, CD=Client
Devices, DC=Data Centres, A=Availability, DT=Disruption Tolerance, FT=Fault Tolerance, SEC=Security, I=Integrity
recovering from malicious and non-malicious faults [69]. The solution employs VM introspection and anomaly-based
integrity verification to detect intrusions or errors arising. A reactive solution using the VI is then employed. However,
it could be argued that repetition of malicious actions could allow a malicious user to plot the state changes taken and
thus understand the intent of the IDS. Likewise during the evaluation of the system, the authors claim that despite a
noticeable increase in resource use when implementing the introspection system, the attacker would not be able to
detect the use of the system. Again, this is not a sufficient means of disguising the use of the system as comparative
analysis would result in wide variations in performance against a system that did not employ the introspection.
Reizer and Kapitza also employ VI for a proactive recovery (periodic node refreshing) system [96], primarily for
intrusion relation failures. They explain that proactive recovery reduces support for recovery from genuine faults and
also decreases system availability time. In their solution a domain is replicated across numerous, isolated guest domains
where all network activity is proxied via a remote server. Diversity between the guest and primary domains ensures
attacks will not affect the replica domains. This will hold true as long as the service is developed to be deterministic.
Although unable to protect against a physical fault, this system will prevent against malicious and non-malicious faults.
However there are large cost and time implications due to the additional resources required.
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Jhawar and Vincenzo propose a similar method named Remus [54]. It uses replication leveraging VI to provide a
high degree of fault tolerance. The system periodically snapshots the host’s state, storing a backup in memory. This
ensures prompt availability. It is possible that anomalous data would cause both systems to crash, whereas the diversity
in the previous work clearly protects against this. VM replication techniques are found often such as in [101] and [34].
Egwutuoha et. al [36] and Tchana et. al. [115] examine resilience at the process-level. They provide replication and
check-pointing of individual processes in order to recover from faults. These techniques could be considered more
resource optimal than checkpointing an entire VM whilst also more relevant to container-based architectures. However
the security implications of changing the integrity of a running VM are concerning.
Binun et.al focus upon the resilience of the VMM [21]. They present a novel self-stabilising hypervisor for increased
robustness against malicious faults. A Stability Manager examines the VMM and its VMs for any misbehaviour, resetting
the VM, software or physical machine when a subversion is detected. Whilst the system does provide an adequate
method of resisting intrusions it is uncertain whether it is possible to recover from a persistent threat. Without adequate
constraints, it might be easy for an attacker to perform a DoS upon the machine through corruption, requiring a
constant reboot. There are further performance issues, as with the integrity check, requiring the entire system to freeze.
Kanter and Taylor present a hypervisor which uses compiler and run-time techniques to increase diversity within an
application, making attacks more costly [57]. Their combination of techniques prevents all memory addresses within
the application being known to an attacker a-priori, however it does require the application’s source code. This extreme
case of diversity across the cloud infrastructure enables high resilience. The method is used in the deployment of an
OS named Bear consisting of a minimal kernel and a VMM, where the kernel and all other components, including
device drivers, are periodically refreshed with new, diverse replacements. A point of note is that it does not attempt
to detect intrusions, and operates without any further information. This is a useful characteristic which mitigates
detection-related issues. They mention that performance is degraded due to the additional processes, the compile time
decrease at 5% typically and sometimes up to 16%. However the benefits of having a different set of binaries for every
individual host in the cloud outweighs the performance hits.
Xu and Huang focus upon VMM resilience. [127]. Where execution of each VMM is replicated across a another.
This provides resilience against hardware layer faults. Essentially providing redundancy for hardware, the system is
successful with minimal overhead. However, the authors mention that the replication mechanism is not self-protecting
2.2.3 Virtual Networking. Providing resilience within the networking layers of a cloud architecture is the focus of a
number of works seen in literature. Resilience within networks may often be considered in terms of its survivability,
distributed information systems being the focus of the term survivability [126]. As networking operates on a variety of
different layers, the resilience may again differ depending on the layer in question. Clouds may be distributed across
multiple geo-locations and therefore require resilience on the physical layer. They also employ considerable quantities
of virtualisation and with the advent of SDN networking in the upper application layers can become complex. Table 4
summarises the following literature.
Bui et. al. investigate two methods for ensuring resilience in virtual networks [22]. They consider network resilience
from the perspective of both the PN providers and VN operators and in particular, the mapping between these two layers.
Their resilience models involve handover to another DC during primary failure, with the resilience techniques involving
source routing to the secondary DC. Two tests were conducted where data centres where uniformly distributed and
locally paired. The results showed that the VN routing performed slightly better than the PN routing during uniformed
location distribution whilst during the paired locations there was very little difference.
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Table 3. Instance and VMM Resilience Techniques
Method Model Components Disciplines Limitations
Snapshots with error ranking[85] IaaS VI FT High replication cost and stor-
age, state-management
Snapshots with VM introspection and
anomaly detection[69]
IaaS VI FT High replication cost and stor-
age, state-management, win-
dows only
Proactive recovery [96] IaaS VI FT High replication cost and
storage, state-management, no
physical fault protection
Periodic snapshots and recovery [54] IaaS VI FT High replication cost and stor-
age, state-management
Process level replication, checkpointing
[36]
PaaS/IaaS VI, RM FT Medium replication cost and
storage, state-management, VM
integrity
Process checkpointing [115] PaaS/IaaS VI, RM FT Medium replication cost and
storage, state-management, VM
integrity
VI replication [101] IaaS VI FT High replication cost and stor-
age, state-management
VI replication [34] IaaS VI, RM FT High replication cost and stor-
age, state-management
Replication, checkpointing of HV using
introspection [21]
IaaS PI, VI RB, FT Liable for anomaly subversion
Compiler and runtime software diver-
sity [57]
IaaS PI, VI, RM SRV Requires application source-
code
VMM replication / mirrors with mini-
mal overhead [127]
IaaS PI, VI, RM FT High Replication cost
VI=Virtual Infrastructure, RM=Resource Management, PI=Physical Infrastructure, FT=Fault Tolerance, RB=Robustness,
SRV=Survivability
Barla et. al. consider the performance of network resilience methods [13] with the motivation of SLAs guaranteeing
various quality of IT services but not end-to-end communications. VN is cited as a solution to this issue. The study
simulates two scenarios, in the first the VN is responsible for the resilience and in the second, the PN operator is
responsible for the resilience. The results indicated that the VN always outperformed the PN. Complexity of the design
is mentioned for consideration. The authors expand this further in [14] and [15] where they providing models for
developing the VNs. These were shown to outperform previous approaches by finding a resilient solution in every
case, drastically reducing communication delays.Barla et. al. next examine resilience in VNs using redundant back-up
links (refereed to as shared protection)[12], similar to the approach employed in [71] for physical networks. They use
redundant resources shared amongst multiple VNs, accomplished through appropriate information exchange between
the PN operator and VN operator. As before, the VNs outperformed the PNs with the addition of cost saving benefits
through optimised set-up. This work highlights the effectiveness of providing high-level resilience.
Harter et. al. [47] confirms the benefits of shared protection mechanisms, with cost savings of 10-20%. This model
includes heuristics to make the algorithm highly scalable.
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Bui et. al. consider the problem of mapping VNs to PNs under varying time constraints [23]. Their solution enables
the selection of appropriate PN and (consequently) DC resources for resilient re-routing of networks under varying
time constraints. As an improvement upon schemes which allow bandwidth sharing through various backup links, this
system allows backup links to be reprogrammed as needs change over time. Their results show that the benefits of
reconfiguration are only applicable if the standard working paths are also reconfigured. Also they are only applicable if
the majority of traffic "does not have Quality of Service (QoS) requirements that prohibit path reconfiguration", which
could be an issue when considering the variety of use cases for cloud traffic.
Secci and Murugesan provide discussion regarding the current cloud network architectures [105]. They stress the
need for resilient clouds as without resilience their services are sub-optimal or even useless, due to the service-oriented
nature. They explain that conventional cloud RM is considered "dumb" due to over provisioning of resources and
in particular, inefficient methods of bandwidth utilisation. They argue that this has caused high centralisation in
geo-distributed clouds, which contributes to high risk of failure and therefore, low resilience. As services must be
distributed across multiple cloud services in order for them to be resilient, this conventional bandwidth utilisation is at
odds with this requirement and therefore the authors suggest that further decentralisation is necessary. To provide
further decentralisation, appropriate overlay networks must be employed to ensure network paths diversity and DC end
points in order to ensure the necessary resilience. The authors conclude by noting that resilience isn’t just a requirement
of highly dependable services but necessary in order to fulfil the fundamental cloud SLA In order to provide this, the
current architecture must change.
Harter et. al. provide a comprehensive discussion regarding the comparing the resilience of different layers and
a novel consideration of the business-oriented responsibilities of each cloud delivery scenario [15]. They provide a
method, determined through simulation, to determine the most favourable layer to provide resilience depending on
the use-case. They conduct a similar study, investigating which layer is the most effective in terms of cost and fault
tolerance to provide the resilience [48]. This time considering PN, VN and overlay networks. The give a framework for
ease of selection.
Osanaiye et. al. focus upon one particular attack type/ resilience problem [87]. They provide a survey and framework
of DDoS mitigation techniques in the cloud. Whilst effective as a traffic tolerant technique, the lack of coverage for
diverse failure types leaves this form of work behind the others.
2.3 Cloud Management
This section reviews literature applying techniques which are operated upon via the cloud-management layer. Tables 5
and 6 provide a summary.
As redundancy is a key component of resilience, task placement can influence its efficacy. Cartlidge and Sriram
present an analysis of the effect of different scheduling algorithms on resiliency [25]. This should be considered as
resiliency of IaaS. They evaluated random, packed (FILO) and clustered VM allocation, showing that packed was the
least resilient, which is obvious when considering single point of failure. Additionally, their results illustrated a clear
link between hardware redundancy and resiliency, although the pack scheduling algorithm was not always consistent.
When adjusting the DC architecture, they concluded that the pack was sensitive to infrastructure types. Although
this work is intuitive, it is interesting when understanding if resilience designed at high layers can overcome the
shortcomings of poor resiliency at lower layers.
Gao et. al present an energy aware scheduling algorithm for cloud resilience [40]. Their framework allows reliability
when faced with soft-errors, often a consequence of varying voltage levels. It has a performance increase of up to 50%
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Table 4. Virtual Networking Resilience Techniques
Method Model Components Disciplines Limitations
Mapping between virtual and
physical, data centre hand over
[22]
Phy/IaaS PI, VI SRV Uniform DC distribution with
minimal performance increase
Optimal overlay networks [13] Phy/Iaas/Paas VN vs PN SRV, FT High VNet design complexity
Leverage VN for layer
selection[14]
Phy/Iaas/Paas VN vs PN SRV, FT Complex high-level manage-
ment
A framework for layer selection
[15]
Phy/Iaas/Paas VN vs PN SRV, FT Complex high-level manage-
ment
Shared protection with back up
links [12]
Phy/Iaas/ VN, PN SRV Lack of compartmentalisation
Scalable heuristic-driven shared
protection [47]
Phy/Iaas/ VN, PN SRV Lack of compartmentalisation
Shared protection with rerout-
ing [23]
Phy/Iaas/ VN, PN SRV Lack of compartmentalisation
Overlay networks creating path
diversity [105]
IaaS/PaaS VN SRV High Complexity and cen-
tralised management
Selection of physical, virtual or
hybrid networking [15]
Phy/IaaS VN, PN R, FT High-level simulation
Cost vs RB across different lay-
ers [48]
Phy+ VN, PN R High-level and constrained sim-
ulation
Cloud DDoS survey and mitiga-
tion framework [87]
Phy+ VN, RM TT Restricted failure types
PI=Physical Infrastructure, VI=Virtual Infrastructure, VN=Virtual Networking, PN=Physical Networking, RM=Resource
Management, SRV=Survivability, FT=Fault Tolerance, R=Resilience, TT=Traffic Tolerance, RB=Robustness
achieved through a hybrid method. Firstly conducting an assessment of static reliability requirements which then leads
into dynamic analysis which can occur at run-time. Their implemented system also considers financial data, which is
an often overlooked, yet principal component of service-oriented cloud systems.
Liang and Lee consider resiliency when developing PaaS clouds [65]. They take a robustness approach which
allows varied and unexpected program input. Their work appears to be concerned with reliability through analysing
sub-component effects upon the application. A SO approach is applied to minimise failures through accurate selection
or replacement of individual components, maintaining a low failure rate.
Verissimo et. al present a novel paradigm, cloud-of-clouds, with their system : TCloud [120]. They argue that DC
distribution is not enough to provide resilience of applications within a cloud, as the security aspects of federated clouds
are not addressed. To provide resilience, the authors argued that a user must be able to combine clouds from multiple
providers providing high diversity. Additionally open architectures are necessary to prevent proprietary vendor lock in
and security features from the lower layers up. Their system accommodates these requirements through providing
multiple solutions in order to "build layers of progressively more trusted components and middleware systems", which
allows layers on the top layer to be trusted due to trusted lower layers. A flaw in this system is that trust in a lower
layer cannot always be guaranteed. The authors suggest an intrusion detection system as an example of lower layer
security, which are regularly circumvented to allow malicious traffic obfuscation. The system includes modularised
components to provide middleware to enable the paradigm, providing a secure and resilient PaaS.
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Sharma et. al present the development of a resilient PaaS leveraging state management, known as ReLo. [106].
Resilient state-management enables a session to persist during application down time. Within their system. agents
reside within an application. If the agent goes down, a handler agent redirects the session to another application.
Essentially the system employs redundancy via a middleware management solution. The single point of failure with
the handler agent is a questionable choice. The authors mention that memory constraints and router time outs having a
negative effect upon the resilience.
Scholler et. al. describe their method of deploying vNFC (chains of virtual instances, providing networking services)
[103] resiliently using their Tenant Infrastructure Management Software (TIMS) upon OpenStack. Different components
within the network service have different resiliency requirements, (e.g. scalability, redundancy). The service describes
the requirement and TIMS manages it appropriately. Both resource and network requirements are given through
Application Layer Traffic Optimisation ( e.g. maximum delay between two components. The system is dependent upon
OpenStack’s availability zone feature, which groups pools resources which allows critical components of one service to
be grouped in different failure locations. The authors identified a number Openstack shortcomings such as low resource
information within the pools.
Klein et. al. discuss the brownout programming paradigm [60], proposed in order to provide enhanced robustness
within cloud services. It attempts to mitigate the requirement to provision large amounts of replicated instances during
traffic increase. This should prevent service run-time failures such as flash crowds. A brownout program will downgrade
a user experience, such as with enhanced features, in order to prevent excessive use of the system. They extend this by
combining with load balancing as the combination currently creates conflict [61]. They propose two novel algorithms
and a production ready load balancer. Their results indicate strong performance compared to alternative solutions.
Torres and Holvoet examine service composition architectures [116]. Their decentralised system relies upon two
distinct agents, the first monitors the network for appropriate, available subtasks to compose a service with. The second
evaluates available resources within the system. These two agents continuously and dynamically assess the current
status of the service enabling a rapid response to faults. Each agent delegates work to lower-level agents, which would
appear to be biologically inspired by ant processes. Empirical evaluation indicated that performance was better than
the common, reactive approach, with lower composition times of between 4 % and 25 %. The authors note that the
system suffers from high communication costs.
Minzhe and Prabir investigate diverse replica software in [45] where the configuration of the OS in which the service
is built upon is varied across the service. The authors present a game theoretical approach to the problem.
Mihailescu et. al. consider the mapping of components of a service, to hardware resources [77]. Their algorithm is
more optimal than global shuffling algorithms, and will eventually converge on a stable global configuration, as long as
application requirements remain consistent. The system improves resilience from hardware faults and network errors
through understanding component inter-dependencies. It models them as graphs where a divisions equates to VM
migrations. The system is dynamic, allowing an end-user to select the required resiliency. Further work might consider
the effect of cost upon this feature.
Carvalho et. al. take a biologically inspired approach to cloud [26]. They employ a multi-layered method with a focus
on distributed service management. The authors focus on mission continuity and survivability during attacks. The work
focuses upon the application of bio-inspired methods of self-organisation and self-management, as well as distributed
coordination, to the service discovery and orchestration processes in the cloud. The system layers consist of firstly
detecting the damage through distributed sensors, optimised resource management and then response/immunisation to
the threat.
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Louati et. al focus upon state-less applications, which are easier to provide resilience to than state-full [70]. Their
solution uses checkpointing and application restart combined with a back-end built upon Distributed Hash Tables
(DHT) for resilient decentralised storage. Nicolae and Cappello also considers checkpointing/restart of applications
to mitigate failures [86]. This time for High Performance Computing (HPC) applications using efficient Virtual Disk
Image (VDI) snapshots.
Villarreal-Vasquez et. al. argue that the typical replication techniques employed for cloud resilience increase the
attack surface of an application and thus are detrimental [122]. They propose a solution which uses Moving Target
Defence (MTD). Migrating instances once an anomaly has been detected and provide self-reconfiguration to return to
base-line state.
Frîncu applie Genetic Algorithms (GA) to component scheduling optimisation [39]. They consider high availability
web applications within the constraint of cost. They propose two distinct algorithms: the first optimises the maximum
number of components upon each node within the cost. The second is sub-optimal, finding the minimum required
so that the application is still available given that all but one node fails. Antony et. al. also investigate scheduling to
optimise resource usage, this time for bandwidth consumption [8]. They provide a heuristic which optimises data
locality to reduce the job completion time and provider fault tolerance to the Balance Reduce (BAR) algorithm.
Liao and Cheng propose a resilient scheduling method which involves servers retrieving batches of jobs and then
processing them according to a specific weighting to mitigate the effect of a malicious fault [66]. Zheng et. al. take
a similar approach [132]. They rank a component’s value and orchestrate a service so that a fault will with have a
reduced or no impact upon operation. Similarly, Ferdousi et. al. take a similar approach [38]. Again applying ranking,
with a greater focus upon the placement of content as opposed to the components themselves.
Al-Ayyoub et. al. provides a framework which leverages mixed integer linear programming to consider multiple
objectives to optimise cost-effective resilience across all levels of cloud infrastructure [5] .
Imran et. al. developed A middleware which uses watchdogs, checkpointing and journaling [51]. It is used to create,
backup and store replicas of application to provide fault tolerance. Whereas Zhao et.al provide a replica oriented
middleware yet with comparatively considerable resource optimisation[131]. whilst only for replications of network
protocols (sockets, web protocols etc.) it is an interesting approach. Although the integrity and confidentially of the
application is in question.
2.4 Decentralised Cloud Resilience
While the previous sections discussed centralised cloud architectures residing in data centres, this section presents
decentralised cloud models such as fog and edge computing. Table 7 summarises this literature.
Due to the constrained nature of IoE devices, data processing, storage and representation must be provided by a third
party platform, typically the cloud. However, the high latency, non-deterministic wireless mediums and high volume of
data make this relationship difficult. Fog computing is the medium in which psuedo-cloud services, mostly temporary
data processing, are provided closer to the edge of the network. Processing data in this form has a greater requirement
for resilience due to device mobility, open wireless mediums, constrained device resources, heterogeneous device types,
cyber-physical systems and hostile environmental conditions.
Service orchestration (SO) is an important process to conduct securely in fog computing. In order to optimise
constrained device resources, only the minimum amount of nodes necessary will be provisioned for an end-user. This
requires service requirements to be broadcast for a network which provides a number of security issues, particularly
confidentiality. Viejo and Sánchez use Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE), whereby nodes will have
15
Woodstock ’18, June 03–05, 2018, Woodstock, NY Welsh and Benkhelifa, et al.
Table 5. Cloud Management Resilience Techniques
Method Model Components Disciplines Limitations
Comparison of task scheduling algo-
rithms [25]
IaaS RM, SCH RB VM only
Energy aware scheduling for software
FT, [40].
IaaS SCH FT, DT Power-related faults only, re-
source intensive modelling
Monitor and optimal selection of hosts
[65]
PaaS SO RB In-depth application analysis
TCloud, a modular middleware and lay-
ered multi-cloud solution [120]
PaaS/IaaS DC, RM SEC, RB Strong interoperability issues,
high cost, contentious reliance
upon trust
Resilient state management using a re-
mote handler [106]
PaaS VI FT Single point of failure
Chains of virtual network instances
[103]
IaaS? VN, VI, SO SRV Centralised management
Brownout experience downgrade [60] PaaS/IaaS VI,RM RB, TT Single replica only, experience
reduction
Brownout experience downgrade with
LB [61]
PaaS/IaaS VI,RM, LB RB, TT Single replica only, experience
reduction
SO using multi-agent monitoring and
feedback [116]
PaaS/IaaS VI,RM, SO, FT High communication cost
SO using diverse OS configurations [45] PaaS/IaaS VI, SO, FT / SRV Conceptual only
Service to hardware dependency mod-
elling, migration and FT monitoring
[77]
PaaS/IaaS VI, VN, RM FT / SRV Static application requirements
SO using self-organisation and self-
management [26]
PaaS/IaaS RM, VI, SO SRV High complexity and resource
intensive monitoring
RM=Resource Management, SCH=Scheduling, SO=Service Orchestration, DC=Data centres, VI=Virtual Infrastructure,
VN=Virtual Networking, LB=Load Balancing,RB=Robustness, FT=Fault Tolerance, DT=Disruption Tolerance,
SEC=Security, SRV=Survivability, TT=Traffic Tolerance,
keys corresponding only to the attributes they are allowed to process [121]. Their network is structured hierarchically
so that nodes pass messages to those it can control further down the tree. The nodes will require a generalised key.
For example, a message containing "temperature" will also need a "weather" key to process it. These messages form
policies such as "temperature, zone 1" which are then encrypted separately and transmitted. If any messages can be
decrypted by a node it means that further nodes in the hierarchy can also be decrypted so the service discovery can
continue. Once the service has been orchestrated between the required nodes, the client and nodes exchange keys to
communicate securely. Chejerla et. al. instead chose to develop a scheduling algorithm that uses a game-theoretic and
Bayesian approach to mitigates against attack in real time, for Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) [28].
Rios et. al explain that modelling fog networks in a hierarchical manner, with a singular provider, is oversimplified
and detrimental to it’s security [97]. They should instead be considered as a federated architecture with numerous
service providers within different trust domains. The authors propose an architecture (SMOG) to provide resilience
in fog networks. It consists of number of baseline characteristics such as secure interconnection, authentication and
authorisation, protection of virtualised environments and situational awareness. They list enhanced characteristics as trust
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Table 6. Cloud Management Resilience Techniques II
Method Model Components Disciplines Limitations
Checkpoint-restart of stateless applica-
tions upon decentralised DHT [70]
IaaS VR, SO, RM FT, A Stateless only
Self-reconfiguring moving target de-
fence [122]
IaaS VI, RM, FT High Complexity and replica-
tion cost
Optimised checkpoint-restart for HPC
using VI [86]
IaaS VR, RM FT High Replication cost
GA based SCH, homogeneous spread of
components across all nodes [39]
IaaS VI, SCH A, FT High initial resource cost and
web app only
Balance Reduce for data locality and job
time reduction [8]
IaaS VI, SCH FT Constrained use-cases
Batches of jobs weighted to prevent ma-
licious faults [66]
IaaS VI, SCH FT, SEC Pull and then process can cause
synchronisation errors
Component quality ranking and service
construct to reduce faults [132]
IaaS VI, SO, FT High complexity
Risk minimisation using content rank-
ing and placement [38]
IaaS VR, PR, DC DT High complexity
Mixed integer-linear programming [5] IaaS VR, PR, SCH A Conceptual online
Replica-oriented middleware [51] IaaS/PaaS VI, RM FT Complexity and resource cost
Multi-component middleware to en-
force policies, determined by anomaly
detection [107]
Phy/IaaS RM, SCH,PM FT, SEC Complexity and resource cost
Networking protocol (Sockets, web etc)
replication [131]
IaaS/PaaS VI, VN, RM FT High complexity and resource
cost, Web sockets only
VR=Virtual Resources, SO=Service Orchestration, RM=Resource Management, FT=Fault Tolerance, A=Availability,
VI=Virtual Infrastructure, SCH=Scheduling, PR=Physical Resources, DC=Data centres, SCH=Scheduling, RM=Resource
Management, Physical Networking, FT=Fault Tolerance, SEC=Security, VN=Virtual Networking
services, distributed decision making, privacy capabilities and digital evidence management. They explain that these base
line requirements are largely missing from literature and are necessary to ensure a secure and resilience fog.
Edge nodes are without doubt a point of failure in any decentralised cloud network. Le et. al. give a solution to
partial failures in MEC (e.g. connectivity loss) between the edge nodes [63]. Their architecture is again hierarchical,
with mobile nodes storing local back up data dispersed amongst them. If partial failure with the edge nodes occurs,
the devices switch to a P2P model, processing data collaboratively. This is an alternative mobile computing model and
the results show good time reduction performance when the task is disrupted across the nodes. However the power
consumption is likely to be highly variable according to the difference between nodes and therefore it the suitability
will not be universal.
Modarresi and Sterbenz consdier Fog Computing as a solution for resilient IoT/edge computing in [80]. They argue
that the uncertainty surrounding resource, link and bandwidth availability ensures that typical edge computing is not
resilient for IoT processing. For example, too many clients can overload resources and thus cause a denial-of-service.
They argue that the introduction of fog nodes between the edge and the cloud creates greater autonomy within the
network. If a connection is lost between the edge and the cloud, the fog maintains this network and increases the
survivability of the ecosystem. Further to this, they suggest that the diversity of standards, protocols and network links,
which caus fog computing to be quite complex, is actually beneficial to its resilience due to the increase in variety. They
17
Woodstock ’18, June 03–05, 2018, Woodstock, NY Welsh and Benkhelifa, et al.
also indicate that through fog reducing traffic further in the core and distribution network, its implementation provides
traffic tolerance. Finally, disruption tolerance is enhanced through a reduction in latency permitting applications to
be processed quicker and thus any disruption has less impact. The authors support these statements with numerous
simulations inclusive of the fog environment.
Hussein et. al. provide a mobile edge computing solution which applies Software Defined Networking(SDN) to 5G
provide resilient processing to Vehicle Area Networks (VANETS) [50]. Safety concerns are paramount in vehicles and as
such so is the resilience of VANETs. Their proposed solutions provides enhanced security through an additional security
layer using SDN. As opposed to a traditional centralised SDN approach or a traditional distributed VANET approach,
they present a hybrid method. A centralised 5G base station is used to manage SDN security functions distributed
across a number of roadside controllers. This approach illustrates a strong example of custom networking hierarchy
technologies being supported at the edge for specific use-cases and resilience requirements.
Modarresi deploys SDN again in tandem with fog for resilience in [79]. This time fog nodes are used to detect
anomalies in network traffic and notify the SDN controller. This can make security-focused decisions about what traffic
to drop or restrict. A strongly illustrative example of the application of fog for greater network resilience although does
not help to strengthen resilience of the fog nodes themselves.
Bensen et. al takes a middleware approach to provide continued operation of critical events from IoT devices
when their connection to the cloud fails [18]. Their system contains two components, the first periodically probes
different paths to the cloud, detecting possible faults or failures. The second provides multicast message dissemination
according to information received from the first component. They again use SDN to provide this information and use it
create "resilient overlays". This middleware approach enables varied support for IoT devices as the middleware works
seamlessly.
Kahla et. al. provide a solution to low trust in IoT environments [56]. They leverage moving target defence to migrate
targeted or subverted virtual instances to another host fog machine. It is not clear how this would prevent a number of
different attacks or heal the instance once it had migrated although the autonomic aspect of integrity verification is
commendable.
Eisele et. al. state that resilience is necessary to consider in edge environments due to both resource and network
uncertainty [37]. Whilst security is important due to the resource constrained nature of edge devices preventing
virtualisation providing adequate isolation. They propose a novel programming paradigm: RIAPS (Resilient Information
Architecture Platform for Smart Grid) which provides a platform for distributed applications to be deployed resiliently.
The platform provides a diverse number of different services and managers (such as for security, persistence, fault
management etc.). Whilst the platform appears to be complex and thus has an increased attack surface, given the
number of required components, it illustrates the notion of an underlying platform providing resilience to higher levels.
Arval et. al. use bayesian belief networks to mine dependencies between replicated edge nodes. Their solution uses
past server performance from logs and temporal dependencies to highlight the probability of when failures may occur
concurrently. Although their current solution is theoretical it shows strong optimisation through replica reduction [9].
Neto et. al. tackles a somewhat different resilience problem [10] . Where Fog enabled service does not suffer a fault
but an outage related to the CSPs SLA. They focus on Amazon’s Spot Instances which are transient servers acquired by
the user when the maximum they wish to pay (bid) is greater than the value of the instance. Due to the nature of this
acquisition the continued operation of these servers cannot be guaranteed. Therefore in this fog platform the failure
results from the unavailable CSP back-end. To mitigate this, they propose an agent-based case-based-reasoning solution
which aims to predict the survival time of an instance. This enables checkpoints to be made in order to resume the work
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in case of application fault. Their solution could be modified for application processing closer to the edge, although the
resource requirements for checkpoints must be considered.
Ozeer et. al have a similar focus on recording and reverting to application states [88]. They take an uncoordinated
approach, recording application events with a corresponding recovery timer. Expiration indicates lack of synchronisation
with the physical world and cant thus be ignored. Event details are logged in a global and failure-free storage system to
permit recovery to any node from a central location. This centralised storage suffers from central point of failure. The
authors present a competent yet complex solution consisting to enable system fault tolerance. The question of how
failures are to be handled in the system handling the failures is still open.
Khalifa et. al. move away from a traditional cloud architecture, improving the resilience of Hybrid Mobile Clouds
[59]. Mobile clouds require greater resilience than a static system due to the dynamic network characteristics. The
proposed architecture is interesting due to its flexibility in running on a diverse devices, essentially ignoring the
underlying hardware. The resilience requirements are aided through a resource prediction mechanism and an early
failure detection mechanism to facilitate handover of vital services. The system proves successful, although performance
is still dependent upon the quantity of fixed nodes within the cloud, making the system not purely mobile. However,
overall it exhibits a good example of how cloud systems can be built upon non-deterministic environments.
2.5 Alternative Architectures
Some work will choose to encourage a conventionally different cloud architecture in order to provide increased resilience.
Table 8 summarises this literature.
An alternative to the infrastructure layer, Suciu et. al. present SlapOS [113]. They choose to provide a purely
distributed cloud architecture where single point of failure is remedied through distributed the cloud resources over
multiple PCs within homes, as opposed to within DC. Whilst this might bring forth bandwidth, capacity, and latency
issues; the benefits of reducing single point of failure are considerable. Particular for safety-critical events such as
during disasters.
Courteaud et. al consider further resilience of SlapOS [31]. They refer to the concept of community cloud, whereby
the cloud is collaboratively built from personal devices. The main current issues are summarised as: 1) Migrating from
commodity cloud to resilient, secure and dependable clouds 2) Promoting diverse and open ecosystems 3) Building a
coherent, modular and reusable architecture. They also consider the leader selection problem (the process of selecting
the next master node after loss of the current). Further issues include: implementation an accurate failure detection
methods, and methods of replicating the master database prior to handover to another master node. The authors not that
conventional delivery models of (IaaS/PaaS/SaaS) become obsolete. Finally, the authors explain that an implementation
of hierarchical masters (such as with DNS) will be implemented for increased resilience. Whilst the architecture and
delivery model is certainly interesting there are issues directly relating to resilience concerning master node hierarchies
which undoubtedly cause problems. A decentralised system such as this is not as resilient as one which is purely
distributed.
Garlick also considers community cloud based resilience [41]. They promote the model as an enhancer for organi-
sational resilience. As with SlapOS, the author highlights the ownership and location of current cloud models being
unsuitable for providing resilience. The authors note that for natural disasters centralised disaster recovery is too
late and excessive. They argue that disaster recovery must be conducted at the community level. The breakdown
of communication networks is cited as a key issue, where the more effective communication was developed by the
decentralised communities. The author explains that community cloud models enable the benefits of public cloud
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Table 7. Decentralised Cloud Resilience Techniques
Method Model Components Disciplines Limitations
SO using Attribute Based Encryption
[121]
PaaS/SaaS EDGE, RM, SO C, I Resource intensive cryptogra-
phy and hierarchichal network
structure




SEC Conceptual model for resilience,
high complexity
Hierarchical data replication and ser-




A, DT Questionable energy consump-
tion per task
Fog computing for resilience [80] IaaS FOG SRV, DT, TT High Resource cost and gover-
nance issues
Decentralised SDN for 5G VANETS [50] IaaS CONS, IOT,
TRAN, EDGE
DT, SRV Centralised management
Fog-enabled anomaly detection for SDN
[79]
IaaS TRAN SRV, SEC Centralised management
SDN middleware for critical events us-
ing rerouting andbackup links [18]
PaaS/SaaS EDGE, TRAN SRV, FT, Single point of failure
Anomaly detection and moving target
defence [56]
IaaS/PaaS VI, CONST, RM I, FT Questionable resource cost
Watchdog-based multi-layer program-
ming architecture [37]
PaaS VI, VN, RM FT High Complexity
Dependency mining for replica predic-
tion and optimisation [9]
IaaS/PaaS VI, RM FT Theoretical
Agent-based spot-instance survival rea-
soning [10]
IaaS/PaaS VI, RM DT Specific to one cloud provider
Uncoordinated application checkpoint-
ing and replication [88]
IaaS/PaaS VI, RM FT, SRV Single point of failure
Resource-predicting Hybrid mobile
cloud [59]
IaaS PH DT Dependent upon fixed nodes
Game theoretic with bayesian approach
to SCH during real time attack [28]
IaaS SCH, VI, EDGE A, SEC Attack-specific
C=Confidentiality, I=Integrity, SEC=Security, A=Availability, DT=Disruption Tolerance, SRV=Survivability, TT=Traffic
Tolerance, RM=Resource Management, SO=Service Orchestration, CONS=Constrained Devices, TRAN=Transportation,
EDGE=Edge Devices, VI=Virtual Infrastructure, FOG=Fog Computing, IoT=Internet of Things devices, VN=Virtual
Networking, PH=Physical Hardware, SCH=Scheduling, EDGE=Edge Devices, FT=Fault Tolerance, DT=Disruption
Tolerance, A=Availability, SEC=Security
offerings with greater control. Issues surrounding community clouds, such as malicious users, are said to be mitigated
through user vetting, a process which may not always be practical or effective. Sathiaseelan et. al. presents a similar
discussion is [100]. Where similar they highlight that commodity hardware based community clouds have considerable
advantages over resilience due to the highly decentralised nature.
Sterbenz and Kulkarni preset DefCloud [111] which attempts to provide greater resilience through increasing
diversity and redundancy within all layers of the cloud architecture. Highly flexible, it allows resilience to be adjusted
in a "service-aware manner". This might be argued to be similar in concept to the usability vs security trade-off. Such a
feature is likely necessary for a cloud platform which accommodates a wide spectrum of use-cases. The authors argue
that the first point in designing the infrastructure, is the removal of monoculture as it enables malware and attacks
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to propagate effectively through only needing to attack one type of hardware architecture or software application.
This concept is then applied to all layers of the cloud. Firstly is the infrastructure layer diversity. This is encompasses
data-centre diversity and cloud diversity. They consider DC diversity considered sub-trees of features where similar
trees are not selected in tandem in order to maximise diversity. For example similar trees will utilise the same network
vendor hardware or operating systems. Whilst diversity provides resilience against security related failures, it does not
protect against failures from direct physical DC attacks, e.g. natural disasters or military attacks (such as an EMP). To
mitigate these issues, the architecture applies cloud diversity through distributing the cloud over multiple geo-locations,
using varying ISPs. After the infrastructure layer, the DefCloud then assures resilience through Process-level Program
diversity, where diversity focuses upon distribution via space and time. Spatial diversity is concerned with distribution
of different software versions. Temporal diversity is concerned with varying application configurations over time.
Application diversity ensures binaries are diverse e.g. an attack on one application binary will not apply to another.
Whilst this has consequences on the current state of 0-day exploits, it complicates the software development process.
DefCloud undoubtedly covers resilience in the cloud through adaptions of the conventional architecture, the system
lacks real implementation or simulation and thus its resilience is yet to be determined. For one, the complexity of the
system is clearly greater which increases the attack surface.
Keromytis uses similar diversity in their MEERKATS system [58]. It is a fully novel architecture for a security mission
critical cloud. The system constantly evolves across all aspects, reducing monoculture and increasing diversity. One
component of the system, DREME [16], is concerned with execution diversity of replicas and provides a framework for
I/O redirection.
IBM present a somewhat novel architecture name SCE+ [99] which is built from the ground up to be highly resilient.
The authors make the distinction between typical cloud architectures employed by Amazon and Google by explaining
that they are constructed from "redundant, inexpensive, expendable building blocks" whereas the IBM SCE+ employs
"high-end building blocks with significant internal redundancy and an established track record of very high MTBF for
every element." It would appear that the contrast is in SCE+ employing mature and extremely resilient fewer components
with conventional architectures employing many less mature components and relying upon replication/redundancy. The
architecture applies resiliency to differing cloud layers. The physical layer is designed so as to avoid single point of failure
through division of resources and replication in separate geo-locations with a backup dark-fibre link. Software resilience
is then considered from multiple aspects. Components are deployed in redundant pairs and constant "health-checks" are
in place to monitor correct functioning. In addition, redundancy of data and regular backups ensures resiliency within
the data layer. The authors explain that standardisation of hardware within the system components aids the resilience,
however this is contentious, as diversity within hardware is surely a necessity for resiliency. They cite virtualisation as
an enabling factor of the resilience, however this is typically a component of cloud infrastructures anyway and therefore
offers the environment no additional advantage. Overall the architecture offers a variety of additional components
for resilience although some are questionable such as the physical distance between components as well as the added
complexity within the system.
Hariri et. al. present an architecture based on biologically inspired processes which allows tunable redundancy
at multiple cloud levels, known as BioRAC [46]. One layer of the architecture involves division of components into
"cells" which allows dynamic real-time configuration and combine together to form an "organism" which then is
then applied to a particular goal. In an additional layer, the system provides high levels of diversity through varying
execution and finally it provides intelligent algorithms for collaborative threat alert and detection. Although lacking an
implementation, the architecture is interesting in providing a system designed with resilience from the ground up with
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novel components, as opposed to those adapted on top of conventional systems. However the system complexity due
its multiple layers has an adverse effect upon its resilience.
Table 8. Alternative Architecture Resilience
Method Model Components Disciplines Limitations
SlapOS - cloud distributed across homes
[113]
IaaS VR, RM, CONS R Low/non-deterministic redun-
dancy
Modular and highly diverse SlapOS [31] IaaS VR, RM, CONS R Low/non-deterministic redun-
dancy
Diversity using community clouds [41] IaaS VR, RM,
CONST
DT, SEC Low redundancy, uncertain gov-
ernance
DefCloud using strong diversity across
all layers [111]
IaaS VR, PR, RM SRV, FT, High complexity
MEERKATS constant evolving diversity
[58]
IaaS VR, RM SRV, FT, Resource intensive
DREME replica execution diversity [16] IaaS VR, RM SRV, FT, Resource intensive
SCE+ using mass redundancy [99] IaaS VR, RM FT Resource intensive
BioRac, cell based diversity and redun-
dancy [46]
IaaS VR, RM SRV, FT, Resource intensive, High Com-
plexity
SDN for resilient industrial IoT [100] IaaS CONS, CONST R Centralised management, high
complexity
VR=Virtual Resources, RM=Resource Management, CONST=Constrained Devices, CONS=Consumer Devices,
PI=Physical Infrastructure, R=Resilience, DT=Disruption Tolerance, SEC=Security, SRV=Survivability, FT=Fault
Tolerance
2.6 Evaluation and Models
As with the resilience disciplines, measurement of cloud resilience could follow traditional performance-based resilience
metrics such as Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and Mean Time Taken to Repair (MTTR) and the corresponding
availability which is easily calculated from the two. However these metrics could be considered primitive at best [30]
considering the complexity of these environments. The resilinets model [112] provides a method of determining which
resilience features are available through binary selection of distinct features (e.g. the network provides confidentiality or
it does not). Other non-cloud specific resilience metrics also suffice, such as graph metrics. Graph metrics are noted for
their ease of comparing distinct architectures as they examine the structural characteristics of a network. Alenazi and
Sterbenz evaluate a number of graph metrics for resilience are [6] and [7]. These include elementary metrics such as
the quantity of nodes, node connectivity (the average number of connected nodes to each other node), node centrality
(the most important nodes) etc. They also include those specifically for network resilience through removal of links and
nodes e.g. network criticality and effective graph resistance. All of the above are arguably strongest when examining a
distinct service as opposed to the entire cloud environment. Some of the works surveyed according to layer perform
some form simulation of a model in order to evaluate resilience within the context of that particular use-case, the
following works focus upon more generalised models for resilience.
Jabbar states that resilience is more difficult to measure than traditional security metrics due to the need to evaluate
how effectively the service is still being delivered [52]. They propose that resilience should be measured as a state
space considered in terms of degradation. Where a service is more resilience if it contains more states in which it stays
operational and not severely degraded. Such a high-level approach may be applicable to complex environments.
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Ghosh et. al. provides a model for resiliency based on stochastic reward nets [42]. The work is interesting in that the
metrics for resiliency focus upon evaluating how effectively the job is scheduled through Quality of Service metrics.
Those given are the rate of rejected jobs, and the delay in VM provision. Following from the definition of resiliency:
"quantification of service delivery during changes", the authors evaluate changes as fluctuations in job arrival rate and
the quantity of physical machines. Their results showed a faster provision rate was more resilient. Als that removal of a
hot physical machine has an adverse effect upon resiliency, whereas removal of a cold one has a minimal effect.
Ju et. al. evaluate the resilience of OpenStack [55]. They develop a novel fault injection framework for both the
architecture and its services. They uncovered 23 different bugs which developed into faults in the system. Highlighting
the lack of effective resilience considerations within the stock cloud management software.
Tu and Xu present a resilience model built for a typical IaaS cloud, using Eucalyptus [118]. They explain that resilience
and robustness are strongly connected in complex systems, where both properties describe the system’s ability to react
to disturbances but vary in how they do so. Considering the cloud as a multi-component, hierarchical system, the
model evaluates the component interacting and interdependency upon resource consumption. Resilience is modelled
by the strength of interactions between the components, where the strength is the percentage needed to consume
from another component. A disturbance within the system results in a large queue, exhausting resources causing
the services to fail. The authors describe system wide resilience as the quantity of processes which fail due to the
inability to consume. They note that this system does not take into account factors which may influence the interaction
strength such as one to many and many to one resource consumption interactions. It is mentioned that resiliency
is accomplished through redundancy, which has an adverse affect upon cost. To fit in line with the author’s model,
they explain that increased redundancy, weakens the requirements for resource consumption links between individual
components. Whilst redundancy is a key component of resiliency, it is not the only method, and poor implementations
can even reduce resiliency under certain circumstances. The authors then attempt to understand more about this
effect, examining of replication algorithms with modularisation of a cloud system. Their results show that as size
increases, modulation is more important to prevent duplicate replication updates. However they also mention that
poor modularisation implementation can create a single point of failure and thus become an enabling factor for poor
resilience.
Scholler et. al. present an archtiectural model which enables insight into the security implications of cloud architec-
tures [104] [49]. Their motivation is that current cloud services do not accommodate security and resiliency for critical
infrastructures. Their model distinguishes between the different roles, (such as the physical provider, service developer
and service user) as well as the different infrastructures (the physical and virtual) to assess the given requirements
against the system. It promotes greater logging for audit purposes, as well as increased transparency between the
physical and virtual layers, in order to increase trust between the users. Arguably, many issues within current cloud
architectures ensure their unsuitability for a wide range of critical infrastructure services.
Sousa et. al. conduct an evaluation of Quality of Resilience evaluation criteria within the cloud, in order to activate
appropriate proactive resilience measures [109]. They propose to use multiple criteria to evaluate the resilience, partly
due to the wide variety of requirements associated with resilience and also because many proactive mechanisms require
further information. The authors implement proactive resilience systems using multiple criteria for the cloud, MeTH
[108] and TOPSIS [117]. The results showed that both methods improved the resilience of protocols which were unable
to detect cloud layer faults but MeTH provided the greater performance in both fault and non-fault scenarios.
A classification of types of resilience metrics found within cloud computing is described below:
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• Binary feature based metrics are those relating to the resilinets model such as confidentiality which either
exist in the service of cloud or do not.
• State-based are those which examine the degradation of service to determine when resilience has failed.
• Performance-orientedmetrics are the traditional type such as MTTR or QoS which typically involve examining
one distinct service.
• Graph-based metrics examine issues in topologies such as network criticality.
• Multi-criteria metrics aggregate and summarise a variety of metrics into one to take into account very complex
systems.
3 STATE-OF-THE-ART ANALYSIS
After reviewing the work in the previous section, an analysis of the state of the art of resilience in cloud literature is
given in this section. It summarises the techniques used at each layer and the limitations of these techniques within the
context of resilience in cloud environments. The complexity of the cloud environment is reflected in the multitude of
characteristics and methods involved which enable resilience in cloud systems.
3.1 Techniques and Disciplines - Discussion and Limitations
To reiterate, the work in the previous section was grouped depending upon the layer of the cloud architecture it
focuses upon. Some of the techniques employed may be seen across different layers but in different forms. Diversity
and redundancy are two characteristics which are necessary attributes for a resilient system, albeit inherently costly.
Both may be seen throughout the literature of cloud resilience in differing forms. The other techniques are autonomic,
enabling dynamic adaptation to persist in service delivery.
The review in the previous section examined literature on cloud resilience for technique, architectural component
applied, resilience disciplines used and the cloud layer in which the work is situated. Figure 2 classifies the techniques
used to achieve resilience in the cloud into 3 separate categories: redundancy, diversity and autonomic management.
Many of these techniques require no description, such as redundancy and diversity in hardware. However the autonomic
techniques may be considerably more complex and will provide for new avenues of research. For example the manage-
ment techniques to schedule and orchestrate services, and provision hardware are popular research topics although not
always for resilience. Whilst software diversity techniques also see many different methods from dynamically altering
protocols in transit to altering execution path diversity. Table 9 summarises the techniques and their limiations at each
layer in the cloud.
Data-centre and physical resilience techniques leverage redundancy and diversity in both network links and data
centre distribution, with survivability a notable discipline which is intuitive given the resilience upon networking
at this layer. Most of these works tend to focus on resilience in inter-datacentre optical networks and most strongly
in the placement and provisioning of datacentres. The latest studies push towards software defined techniques and
evaluation/optimisation with upper-layer techniques. This point illustrates the weakness in attempting resilience at
this layer due to the centralisation of management. Focusing resilience upon these layers is not feasible for the mast
majority of cloud users/providers. Only those that manage at the datacentre or optical fibre link layer can affect this
resilience.
Storage resilience techniques largely rely upon fault tolerance, optimising replication to both reduce the cost and
optimise the processes involved. This is likely due to the most prevalent issue occurring in storage resilience is the
failure of physical mediums. These can involve low level techniques such as erasure coding or topology/policy based
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Fig. 2. Classification of techniques used in cloud resilience
placement methods. Due to the wealth of data involved in storage, techniques involving the CIA triad are also prevalent.
Arguably data storage is a point of weaknesses in environments due to its cost and high target for theft. Therefore a
better method of resilience might be to prevent its long term storage at all, where possible. These techniques, although
attempt to optimise storage usage are still strongly resource intensive.
Atomic instance resilience techniques, as with storage, mostly focus upon fault tolerance techniques enabling
process and system level snapshots, and replication. Again, as with storage, these techniques are very resource intensive
and highlight the weakness in statefull applications operating in these environments. On a slightly higher level,
hypervisor resilience techniques can again be seen using replication techniques although the diversity in compiler and
runtimes is certainly an interesting and effective method if deployed correctly and with managed complexity.
Virtual networking techniques also tend to focus on survivability with some fault tolerance and traffic tolerance
also. This is again an intuitive finding given the network-oriented nature of these work. Overall the techniques seen
will often use some intelligence to optimise the way virtual overlay networks select links or route traffic upon the
lower level physical networks, with some resource optimisation occurring to aggregate traffic on links with similar
requirements and diversity selected to maximise survivability. Overall physical-aware virtual techniques show strong
performance results. Virtual networks have been used for resiliency for a considerable time and it could be argued
that many elementary networking techniques (e.g. VLANS) are virtual abstractions of underlying resources leveraged
to increase resilience. The current drive towards software-defined-networking [102] is therefore a strong contender
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and proponent for using virtual networking to provide resilience. However software-defined environments have
considerable complexity and often found in centralised form therefore must be managed to enable its resilience.
Cloudmanagement resilience techniques have the largest body of works. These tend to focus on the management of
virtual resources (mostly virtual instances) to enable a wide variety of disciplines such as fault tolerance and robustness
but also a number of security disciplines too. This shift in focus from the other layers (which tend to focus on one
isolated discipline or cloud component) is likely due to the more holistic perspective at this layer. Component monitoring
is a prominent method here, with the orchestration and scheduling of services also highly ranked. The majority of these
techniques are accomplished through a novel middleware, with interoperability a crucial enabling factor. Overall this
layer provides a clear advantage to conduct resilience and is arguably essential in either monitoring or execution. Some
limitations of techniques at this layer include the lack of ability to affect lower level resilience, the huge complexity
involved and the contrasting objectives between different applications.
Decentralised cloud resilience studies are spread across a number of disciplines. Survivability and fault tolerance
are present as before but a number of security disciplines can be seen in addition to disruption and traffic tolerance.
These techniques often focus on networking such as routing or middleware. However the data-driven nature of these
environments, coupled with the inherently low security drives data security methods. Techniques such as ABE and
anomaly intrusion detection are low-resource alternatives to traditional security solutions, designed to operate in hostile
environments. Redundancy is still prevalent despite the lack of resources through the use of instance checkpointing,
although the efficacy of this is questionable. What is missing from these disciplines are those disciplines which provide
strong network resilience due to high node churn which may become an issue in contested and highly mobile smart
environments in the future.
Alternative architectures present some variety on those previously mentioned. Diversity techniques are strongly
represented, from topology based geo-spatial techniques on consumer hardware, execution level techniques or simply
including diversity into every aspect of the architecture. The lack of redundancy based techniques over diversity could
be argued as an attempt to move away from the costly methods which are undoubtedly have a negative effect. The
primary limitations of these works is that most of these architectures are experimental yet evidence that drastically
diverging from the traditional cloud architecture in order to provider stronger resilience yet meeting the functional
requirements is possible and effective.
3.2 Resilience Techniques and Actor influence
It is also necessary to understand which actors can influence resilience at each layer. Therefore figure 3 illustrates the
different techniques applied by actors at each layer. As the resilience techniques discovered focus mostly upon the
resilience of the service as it is composed, the 3 most relevant actors were chosen. The CSP, the user and also the cloud
broker. The cloud auditor and cloud carrier (as defined by NIST [76]) were excluded due to their lesser influence upon
service composition. The rationale for each actor’s influence at each layer is defined in table 10, ranked from 0 (no
influence) to 3 (definite influence). The stronger user influence with VR can be strongly seen. Additionally, the more
even distribution of influence at decentralised vs centralised cloud layers highlights a shift in responsibility.
3.3 Research Gaps
After an analysis of the previous work, a number of gaps may be seen in literature which may be addressed in future
work. This work can span multiple levels but specifically concerns resilience in cloud environments which are disparate
from the traditional cloud architectures.
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Table 9. Summary of cloud resilience techniques and their limitations
Layer Techniques Summary Limitations
Physical Layer and
Data-centre
Redundant network links and data cen-
tres
Costly redundancy
Diversity through data-centre and
server placement
Not suitable, variable for majority of cloud users
Autonomic management Centralisation and complexity
Storage Resilience Resource replication optimisation State-management complexity. Costly and
could even be eliminated in certain use-cases
Atomic instance Replication with some optimisation e.g.
check pointing
State-management complexity. Costly and
could even be eliminated in certain use-cases
Virtual Networking Intelligent link selection and lower-
level mapping
Requires accurate information exchange, com-
plexity
Traffic aggregation Reduces compartmentalisation and therefore
incident isolation
Autonomic management Centralisation and complexity
Cloud Management Service orchestration Complexity, multiple conflicting goals (SLAs)
Task scheduling Complexity, multiple conflicting goals (SLAs)
Component monitoring Resource intensive






Data-driven security methods Cryptography heavy and resource intensive
Some redundancy questionable resource usage
Decentralised autonomic management Complexity
Alternative Architec-
tures
Strong diversity techniques experimental nature suffering from interoper-
ability, "vendor" lock-in
Table 10. Rationale for Actor Influence upon Cloud Resilience Techniques
Layer CSP Broker User
DC and Physical 3 – Has definite control over the
selection of Dcs, links and cloud
management.
1 – minimal selection
capacity
1 – Minimal selection capacity
Storage and atomic in-
stance




2 – Some control over data and
software




2- some control over virtual
overlays
Cloud Management 3 – ultimate control over all as-
pects of cloud management
2 – some capacity for or-
chestration etc.
0 – no capacity
Decentralised 2 – cloud roles and responsibili-
ties become dynamic
2 – some capacity to se-
lect providers
2 – influence with providers,
geospatial and own devices
Alternative 3 – has ultimate control over
management although often au-
tonomic
2 – some capacity to se-
lect providers
2 – stronger influence with user-
driven models
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Fig. 3. Cloud resilience techniques used at each layer with corresponding actor influence upon resilience. 0=No influence, 1=Mild
Influence, 2=Moderate Influence, 3=Definite Influence
3.3.1 Focus on specific layers. A key factor which is deemed relevant to the growing field of cloud which is one only
investigated in an isolated context, is how does the effect of resilience upon one layer, affect the resilience of another
layer? For example, if resilience is enabled by a user in the platform/service oriented layers but the underlying physical
layer has low resilience, to what extent is it still possible to enable increase resilience in this manner? Such a topic is
highly relevant to the way in which cloud architectures are evolving to more mobile and less deterministic networks
and away from highly deterministic data centre environment. This has been touched on in some works such as the
mapping from VNETS to physical networks [22] but there does not exist models or metrics to determine it for whole
delivery platforms, i.e. a resilient PaaS on an non-resilient infrastructure. In addition this touches on the efforts of the
layered resilience model which was the focus of the state of the art survey.
In terms of physical layer resilience, the exact effect upon resilience in the cloud with different levels of diverse
hardware has seen minimal work. Therefore future research directions in this area could see the exact effect of
diversification of hardware resources upon the resilience of a system be investigated. Barriers to this research mostly
involve cost and time; as the necessary hardware, proprietary licenses and practical work involved in evaluating these
scenarios ensures it is difficult to implement. However simulations may enabled a realisation of evaluating this approach.
3.3.2 Constraints and adaptive resilience. The ability to dynamically adjust within constrained environments is another
area not touched upon sufficiently. Whilst some work within engineering has focused upon applying dynamic algorithms
to graph analysis and optimisation, little work has been conducted which leverages this for the cloud. Again this has
particular relevance for mobile environments due to the constrained resources available for optimisation and the more
dynamic environment. Autonomic optimisation in WSNs is not a new concept [74]. Portocarrero et. al. conduct a
28
On Resilience in Cloud Computing : A survey of techniques across the Cloud Domain Woodstock ’18, June 03–05, 2018, Woodstock, NY
systematic review [92] and a number of optimisation and routing techniques [35]. Autonomic self-* characteristics
are employed in certain types of networking but further work can involve an evaluation and comparison of different
algorithms for both traditional and mobile cloud environments. Another area which could be expanded upon is the
theoretical nature of enabling resilience within the context of various constraints. This has particular relevance to cloud
SLA but also to constrained models. In short it concerns the analysis of requirements to enable the degree of resilience
for the service. As resilience can be considered a scale (i.e. with state-based metrics) as opposed to a binary value, such
a model could aid the construction of a service within its given constraints across all cloud service models.
3.3.3 Emerging Cloud Paradigms. Although not resilience specific, techniques are continuously emerging which attempt
to further optimise cloud processes. These are worthy of consideration given their potential effect upon resilience
although studies are largely lacking in literature. For example, data centre dissagregation is one such technique which
involves managing cloud DCs in a resource-centric manner. This is in contrast to traditional server-centric DCs where
physical resources (e.g. compute and memory) are stored on a single server. Through dissagregation, similar resources
can be be physically decoupled and mounted together in same-resource blades or even racks [114]. This is envisioned
to vastly optimise resource management, Pages et. al. illustrate a 50% increase in virtual instance capacity in optically-
connected intra-DCs[89]. Not only limited to the centralised cloud, Ajibola et.al. illustrate a reduction in 50% of required
fog nodes for specific tasks [4]. Strong performance increases across a variety of paradigms enhances the possibility
of uptake. However few works can be seen which highlight how these techniques affect resilience. At first glance,
homogenous resources spatially grouped together increases the likelihood of low availability of a specific resource and
thus is not resilient. Conversely, enhanced and dynamic resource optimisation may enable dynamic fault tolerance.
There are considerable variation in effects upon resilience with this new paradigm which should therefore be studied
prior to its implementation.
3.3.4 Decentralised Cloud. Arguably, the requirement for resilience at the decentralised cloud layer (i.e. close to
the edge) is greater than the centralised due to data-centre hardware being resilient by nature. Such constrained
environments have less ability to fall back upon redundancy and cryptographic methods in order to provide their
resilience and generally operate in a hostile environment. They might also employ a variety of diversity related
techniques due to disparate hardware involved. The foundation of IoT networks of WSNs and MANETS which have seen
bodies of literature [133] [17] attempting to optimise resilient communication, security etc. It could therefore be argued
that the entire focus of these disciplines is in delivering a resilient platform given the hostile environment in which they
operate. However the decentralised disciplines defined previously consist of more than simply IoT networks. There is
now an entire ecosystem where continuously evolving use-cases demand rich data processing at any and all layers
from the IoT device, to the transportation/Fog layer back to the centralised cloud. These networks are heterogeneous
and non-deterministic which further complicate matters. Traffic will traverse multiple governance domains, operate on
a diverse plethora of hardware/software configurations and requirements for performance and resilience will change in
fractions of a second according to external and internal requirements.
3.4 Challenges for Resilience in Cloud Computing
A final meta-analysis of the results of this survey highlights challenges for resilience in cloud computing which we
envision will drive new avenues of research. Characteristics which create challenges to cloud resilience are discussed
below:
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(1) Use-case Diversity - While cloud environments are inherently employed to provide resources for diverse
use-cases, resilience techniques tend to be developed for specific use-cases. This highlighted the need for cloud
environments to provide adaptive resilience according to the need. Integrating a plethora of techniques and
selecting the most appropriate is thus an ongoing challenge for the current and emerging cloud.
(2) Uncertain and dynamic governance and responsibility - Traditional cloud delivery models (SaaS/PaaS/IaaS)
define clear responsibility boundaries between the CSP and the user. They can assist in determining which actor
can affect resilience at which layer. However, in decentralised cloud disciplines, particularly those with node
mobility (e.g. MEC and fog computing) these actors can dynamically change according to physical boundaries
and network requirements. Ensuring the capacity to both understand and monitor who has responsibility for
resilience extemporaneously is crucial to providing resilience in decentralised clouds.
(3) Evolving cloud paradigms - Summarising a key concern during this survey is the manner in which cloud
computing, as a concept, is continuously in flux. Driven by both changing use-cases and continuous strives
for optimisation, the deployment of new and emerging cloud paradigms poses a challenge to service resilience.
Where the resilience of new techniques should be considered during their development and not post-deployment.
4 CONCLUSION
To conclude this work, we provided a contribution to knowledge through a comprehensive review and analysis of
literature which focuses upon providing resilience across the entire cloud computing consortium. The analysis was
structured according to a novel methodology using specific layers within the cloud architecture to accommodate the
complexity of these environments. This provided a greater insight into the techniques employed and which were lacking
at each layer. We highlighted a number of gaps in literature which focused mostly on the greater need for resilience
at decentralised layers and the edge. Firstly we note that almost no works consider the resilience of both centralised
and decentralised cloud architectures in tandem. Applications for resilience which vary according to the underlying
requirements and can be distributed across multiple disciplines are essential due to the increasing and wide ranging
use-cases for these areas. We also note that many cloud resilience techniques rely on the costly method of redundancy.
The "seemingly unlimited" resources available in centralised cloud environments will be a key driver of these techniques.
However for decentralised cloud disciplines this is less applicable due to their resource constrained nature. One solution
is to move to stateless applications where storage redundancy is not needed. Autonomic techniques for managing
decentralisation are highlighted as a strong candidate for resilience in constrained environments. Finally understanding
and considering the dynamic boundaries of responsibilities for resilience in emerging and decentralised cloud is vital.
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